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ABSTRACT: In Nihil Unbound and other shorter works, Ray Brassier develops his contemporary 
transcendental realism by adopting the nihilistic aspects of thinkers such as Laruelle, Sellars 
and Badiou, while leaving behind their anthropic residuals. What is surprising is that Brassier 
has yet to publish any critical analysis of Nick Land despite their striking similarities and 
interactions at Warwick University (notwithstanding Brassier’s introduction to Land’s collected 
writings and a 2010 talk on Land). This paper aims to fill in this gap by showing how Brassier 
adheres to Land’s initial philosophy of the negative while rejecting its humanist political 
corollaries in favor of an epistemological turn to science. I will first show how Brassier adopts 
Land’s idea that we must come to terms with our future extinction as the transcendental 
condition for thinking a non-conceptual reality beyond our anthropic delusions of grandeur. 
Unlike Brassier, however, Land goes on to identify capitalism’s destructive processes as the 
organon for death’s transcendental critique. Consequently, Land’s recent work develops a pro-
capitalist, neoreactionary politics with deeply narcissistic tendencies insofar as it rests on 
gratifying individuals’ basest passions and greed. Conversely, Brassier maintains Land’s initial 
notion of death as the transcendental critique of anthropocentrism, but instead links it to 
cosmology’s insight into the solar system’s eventual demise beyond anthropic political processes 
within our control. Although Brassier thereby believes that he is able to appropriate Land’s 
useful conceptual resources for de-anthropomorthizing philosophy while stripping him of his 
humanist political remnants, this paper will conclude by drawing on the suggestions of Mark 
Fisher and Reza Negarestani to proffer a Landian rejoinder to Brassier: even if capitalism is 
anthropomorphic, it is necessary to politically fight against it rather than abandon politics 
altogether in favor of science, if only to rid science of its ideological servitude under the reign of 
capital. 
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One of the most interesting contemporary philosophical projects is Ray Brassier’s 
transcendental realism. In Nihil Unbound as in other shorter works, Brassier develops his 
philosophy in dialogue with other thinkers like Laruelle, Churchland, Sellars, Adorno 
and Horkheimer, Badiou, Meillassoux, Heidegger, Deleuze and Nietzsche.1 In each 
case, Brassier adopts the nihilistic aspects of their respective systems that affirm a 
reality beyond the conceptual, while also leaving behind any anthropic residuals which 
resubmit the real to its appearance to us. By radicalizing these thinkers’ various 
nihilistic kernels and eliminating their anthropocentric about-turns, Brassier is able to 
develop his own transcendental realism, ‘nihilism’, or ‘metaphysics of extinction’. 
What is surprising is that Brassier has yet to publish any critical analysis of Nick 
Land despite their striking similarities and interactions at Warwick University in the 
1990s. At first glance, this might not seem so peculiar given that Land is a rather 
obscure figure who is now more associated with having abandoned serious academic 
scholarship to join the far right’s neoreactionary blogosphere. However, a thinker’s 
obscurity has not stopped Brassier from writing about Laruelle on many occasions. 
Moreover, Brassier has championed Land by editing and publishing his collected 
writings.2 The absence of any substantial critical engagement with Land apart from a 
general introduction to his collected writings and a talk in 2010 at Goldsmiths, 
University of London’s conference on accelerationism is thus surprising.3 
This paper aims to fill in this gap by showing how Brassier adheres to Land’s initial 
philosophy of the negative while rejecting its humanist political corollaries in favor of 
an epistemological turn to science. I will first show how both Brassier and Land agree 
that we must come to terms with our future extinction as the transcendental condition 
for thinking a non-conceptual reality beyond our anthropic delusions of grandeur. 
Unlike Brassier, however, Land goes on to identify capitalism’s destructive processes as 
the organon for death’s transcendental critique. Consequently, Land’s recent work 
develops a pro-capitalist, neoreactionary politics with deeply narcissistic tendencies 
insofar as it rests on gratifying individuals’ basest passions and greed. Conversely, 
Brassier maintains Land’s initial notion of death as the transcendental critique of 
anthropocentrism, but instead links it to cosmology’s insight into the solar system’s 
eventual demise beyond anthropic political processes within our control. Although 
Brassier thereby believes that he is able to appropriate Land’s useful conceptual 
                                                          
1 Brassier, Ray, Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.  
2 Land, Nick, Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007, eds. Robin Mackay and Ray Brassier, Falmouth, 
Urbanomic, 2012.  
3 Brassier, Ray, ‘Session 1’. Accelerationism, conference, Goldsmiths, University of London, September 13, 
2010.  
 VINCENT LE 33 
resources for de-anthropomorthizing philosophy while stripping him of his humanist 
political remnants, this paper will conclude by drawing upon the suggestions of Mark 
Fisher and Reza Negarestani to proffer a Landian rejoinder to Brassier: even if 
capitalism is anthropomorphic, it is necessary to politically fight against it rather than 
abandon politics altogether in favor of science, if only to rid science of its ideological 
servitude under the reign of capital.  
1. LAND’S RIGHT ACCELERATIONISM 
Critique of mortal reason  
To comprehend what Brassier admires in Land’s work and what he repudiates, we must 
first sketch Land’s own philosophical trajectory. From his earliest essays in the late 
1980s to his latest blogposts and internet articles, Land never wavers from his key idea 
that anthropocentrism distorts knowledge of reality’s truly destructive and chaotic 
processes by subordinating it to our all-too-human needs for order, homeostasis and 
stability: ‘there is one simple criterion of taste in philosophy: that one avoid the 
vulgarity of anthropomorphism’.4 According to Land, Kant is the anthropic 
philosopher par excellence inasmuch as he prohibits thinking the noumenon outside of 
any phenomenal relation to us on the grounds that any thought about the things-in-
themselves independent of thought is a performative contradiction in that it is precisely 
a thought about them for us: ‘the paradox of Enlightenment, then, is an attempt to fix 
a stable relation with what is radically other, since insofar as the other is rigidly 
positioned within a relation it is no longer fully other. […] This aggressive logical 
absurdity reaches its zenith in the philosophy of Kant’.5 On Land’s account, all that 
Kant can say about things-in-themselves is that we cannot say anything about them. In 
short, Land’s critique of Kant evinces his key concern to liberate the noumenon’s 
radical alterity from the conceptual prison in which the categories of our subjectivist 
experience and understanding have ensnared it. We can already see that the object of 
Land’s critique is precisely that of Brassier: the Kantian legacy of imagining that reality 
is utterly exhausted by what we know of it without remainder.   
Now, Land reasons, if thought cannot grasp reality’s radical alterity without 
reducing it to a thing for us, the only way to access the real is at the limit or even death 
of thought itself. Death, after all, marks precisely the cessation of subjectivity. Like the 
noumenon, then, death is precisely that before which thinking falls silent. It is thus 
                                                          
4 Land, Nick, The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism, London, Routledge, 1992, p. xx. 
5 Land, Nick, ‘Kant, Capital and the Prohibition of Incest: A Polemical Introduction to the Configuration 
of Philosophy and Modernity’, in Fanged Noumena, p. 64. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 34 
death that marks the ultimate testament to the fact that reality exceeds what we can 
think of it. For Land as for Brassier, our mortality is not a fact to be bemoaned or 
repressed; instead, death should become the transcendental horizon for the critique of 
all anthropocentric, Kantian philosophies, so as to set the stage for the real’s recession 
from the clutches of reason. Therein lies Land’s solution to overcoming Kantian 
anthropocentrism: transfigure death into the transcendental condition by which we 
judge every philosophy’s claim to grasp the real as valid only to the extent that it 
acknowledges the death of itself as an organon of the conceptual: ‘death is the 
impersonal subject of critique, and not an accursed value in the service of a 
condemnation’.6 If Land seems to contradict himself at times by railing against the 
thing-in-itself, it is because he sees it in its Kantian sense as an idea of exteriority that is 
still subsumable under the concept of reason; that is, as ‘an item of intelligible 
representation with no consequence as a vector of becoming’.7 Conversely, a true 
materialism would not affirm a positive knowledge about material reality that would 
therefore be reducible to thought, but rather a notion of matter as an excess that 
thought cannot ever fully synthesize: ‘matter cannot be allotted a category without 
being retrieved for ideality’; and: ‘materialism is not a doctrine, but an expedition. […] 
Exploring acategorial matter navigates thought as chance and matter as turbulence 
“beyond all regulation”. It yields no propositions to judge, but only paths to explore’.8 
For Land as for Brassier, humanity’s demise marks philosophy’s escape out of 
anthropocentrism by obliging us to come to grips with a world without our knowledge 
of it.  
1.2. Land’s theory of technocapitalism 
In the early nineties, Land found a more concrete model for enacting death’s 
transcendental critique of anthropocentrism through the dynamics of technocapitalism. 
Here, Land radicalizes and retools Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of capitalism in 
Anti-Oedipus as a ‘deterritorialising’ process tending towards a ‘body without organs’. For 
Deleuze and Guattari, human individuals ought to be modelled on machines insofar as 
both are composed of parts or ‘organs’, which produce different functions or desires. 
Society, too, is constituted by a ‘territorialisation’ or ‘coding’ of the social body for the 
generation of society’s desires. Given, however, that every society’s territorialisation 
excludes certain desires from the given codes in favour of satisfying other desires, social 
                                                          
6 Land, Nick, ‘Making it with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production,’ in Fanged Noumena, 
p. 268. 
7 Land, ‘Shamanic Nietzsche’, p. 209. 
8 Land, ‘Shamanic Nietzsche’, pp. 209, 210. 
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change always threatens to disrupt the socius by ‘decoding’ or ‘deterritorialising’ the 
accepted codes through the introduction of new flows of desire. In particular, Deleuze 
and Guattari envision capitalism as the ultimate deterritorialising society hitherto. 
Since capitalism is organized around production for production’s sake, it ‘liberates’ the 
serf as a ‘free’ worker and goods through money’s universal equivalent, thereby 
abstracting them from any stable code of desires such that they can be forever 
deterritorialised anew. Through this abstraction or ‘axiomatization’, capitalism tends 
towards what Deleuze and Guattari call, following Artaud, the ‘body without organs 
(BwO)’ without determinate functions and codifications of desire: ‘[capitalism] created 
an axiomatic of abstract quantities that keeps moving further and further in the 
direction of the deterritorialisation of the socius. Capitalism tends toward a threshold of 
decoding that will destroy the socius in order to make it a body without organs’.9 By the 
same token, Deleuze and Guattari qualify that, since capitalism can only organise the 
desiring and social processes of production through the family and State institutions, it 
still depends on a certain territorialisation without which society would simply break 
down. It is not so much capitalism, then, but societal collapse, chaos, madness and 
death that Deleuze and Guattari identify with the ‘full’ body without organs: ‘the full 
body without organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the ungendered, the 
unconsumable. […] The death instinct: that is its name.’10 In the final analysis, then, 
the body without organs is only capitalism’s regulative ideal after which it strives 
without ever attaining it. 
It is at this juncture in Anti-Oedipus that Land intervenes to modify Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory of capitalism in two crucial respects. On the one hand, since Land 
sees humanity’s annihilation as a solution to accessing the real rather than as a problem 
as it is for Deleuze and Guattari, he affirms that we should actively strive to become 
bodies without organs, not even if it kills us, but precisely because it kills us. On the other 
hand, Land adopts Anti-Oedipus’ conception of capitalism as a radically 
deterritorialising machine while ignoring their caveat that capitalism also 
reterritorialises and recodes. On the contrary, for Land, capitalism is nothing other 
than the absolute deterritorialisation of the full body without organs, which was only 
ever a regulative ideal on Deleuze and Guattari’s reading: 
Machinic desire can seem a little inhuman, as it rips up political cultures, deletes 
traditions, dissolves subjectivities, and hacks through security apparatuses, 
tracking a soulless tropism to zero control. This is because what appears to 
humanity as the history of capitalism is an invasion from the future by an artificial 
                                                          
9 Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, et al, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p. 33. 
10 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p.  8. 
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intelligent space that must assemble itself entirely from its enemy’s resources.11 
Whereas we shall see that Brassier will charge Land with anthropomorphising the 
real as per the dynamics of human (capitalist) society, for Land, capitalism is not a 
human, and hence contemptible process. Rather, capitalism embodies the thoughtless 
real itself as it tends towards the destruction of the human species.  
We can already discern from the previous citation that Land specifically sees 
capitalism as deterritorialising anthropoid codes through its constant technological 
onslaught. Where Brassier will focus on the natural sciences and particularly 
cosmology, Land takes his cue from AI researchers like I.J. Good and Vernor Vinge to 
make the case that we will soon create strong AI, which is so much smarter than 
ourselves that it will ultimately do away with us for slowing down its runaway process of 
exponential intelligence explosion as we employ it to execute our petty human needs. 
While these AI researchers seek to warn us of the coming AI threat, Land actually 
encourages that we acquiesce to our imminent extinction at the hands of a 
technospecies of our own making, so as to facilitate their runaway process of absolute 
deterritorialisation: 
It might still be a few decades before artificial intelligences surpass the horizon of 
biological ones, but it is utterly superstitious to imagine that the human dominion 
of terrestrial culture is still marked out in centuries, let alone in some 
metaphysical perpetuity. The high road to thinking no longer passes through a 
deepening of human cognition, but rather through a becoming inhuman of 
cognition.12 
On Land’s reading, AI must not be mistaken for immortal humans; on the 
contrary, AI will be of such a superior intelligence to humans that their thinking is 
literally inconceivable to us. Like death, then, AI marks the transcendental horizon 
beyond which we cannot think, thereby throwing our pretentions to exhaust the 
cosmos through our conceptual cages into radical doubt: ‘what lies beyond is not 
merely difficult to imagine, it is absolutely inconceivable. Attempting to picture or 
describe it is a ridiculous futility’; and: ‘nothing human makes it out of the near-
future’.13 If the technological singularity satisfies Land’s goal, it is because it will 
annihilate the human race by way of an intelligence that is not hampered by 
anthropocentric egocentricities, which can thus think the real, and even embody its 
                                                          
11 Land, Nick, ‘Machinic Desire’, in Fanged Noumena, p. 338. 
12 Land, Nick, ‘Circuitries,’ in Fanged Noumena, p. 293. 
13 Land, Nick, ‘2035, Probably Earlier’, Urban Futures 1.0, blog, June 13, 2011, accessed May 4, 2017, 
https://oldnicksite.wordpress.com/2011/05/13/2035-probably-earlier/; and ‘Meltdown’, in Fanged 
Noumena, p. 443. 
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deterritorialising dynamics. Since Land always identifies the real with the death of 
humankind, the fact that the singularity will wipe us out is no reason to prevent or fear 
its day of judgment, but in fact all the more reason to strive towards it.  
The dark enlightenment  
In his recent writings, Land’s commitment to capitalism as the subject of 
transcendental critique has led him to tactically align himself with the far right’s largely 
online ‘neoreactionary’ tendency. In his now infamous ‘Dark Enlightenment’ piece 
(2012), Land rails against Western democratic societies for being too short-sighted and 
anthropocentric. That is to say, democracy’s reliance on temporary caretaker 
politicians who must appeal to public opinion every few years to be re-elected 
incentivizes them to focus on short-term goals like satiating the populace’s petty and 
parochial desires and needs. If Land laments democracy’s all-too-human gratification 
of public opinion, it is because such short-sightedness renounces the pursuit of long-
term future goals like technological innovation: ‘the democratic virus burns through 
society, painstakingly accumulated habits and attitudes of forward-thinking, prudential, 
human and industrial investment, are replaced by a sterile, orgiastic consumerism, 
financial incontinence, and a “reality television” political circus’.14 On Land’s account, 
democracy amounts to ‘looting the future’, the unknown and the inconceivable, in 
favor of a pure, anthropoid present of ‘techno-industrial retardation’.15 
In place of democracy, Land proffers the ‘neocameralist’ model of society 
championed by Mencius Moldbug (whose real name is Curtis Yarvin) on his blog 
Unqualified Reservations (2007-2013). According to Moldbug’s neocameralism, states 
should be run like businesses by literally permitting businesses to buy and own whole 
states and even countries as their own sovereign property. If capitalist enterprises 
became owners of countries, Moldbug reasons, they would no longer need to waste 
money on bribing politicians to pursue short-term goals. Instead, they can invest their 
resources to building better, more technologically advanced societies to attract 
residents or ‘customers’. In return for getting to live in a CEO-state, the customers 
would provide ‘rent’ to the CEO-sovereign in the form of work and services 
performed. So, whereas the ‘cameralism’ in ‘neocameralism’ refers to the fact that the 
capitalist corporation owns the state as its sovereign property much as a traditional 
monarch, the ‘neo’ denotes the way that the CEO-sovereign is particularly motivated 
                                                          
14 Land, Nick, ‘The Dark Enlightenment (Part 1)’, Urban Futures 1.0, blog, March 2, 2012, accessed April 
14, 2017, https://oldnicksite.wordpress.com/2012/03/02/the-dark-enlightenment-part-1/. 
15 Land, Nick, ‘The Dark Enlightenment (Part 4e)’, Urban Futures 1.0, blog, July 3, 2012, accessed April 14, 
2017, https://oldnicksite.wordpress.com/2012/07/03/the-dark-enlightenment-part-4e/. 
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to improve rather than hamper its residents’ lives to maximize rent, and hence profits. 
As Moldbug encapsulates his theory of neocameralism, ‘this business’ customers are its 
residents. A profitably-managed neocameralist state will, like any business, serve its 
customers efficiently and effectively. Misgovernment equals mismanagement’.16 If Land 
is attracted to Moldbug’s political system, it is because a neocameralist state would be 
free to pursue long-term technological innovation without the democratic politician’s 
need to appease short-sighted public opinion to be re-elected every few years, since the 
CEO-sovereign owns the state outright: ‘modernity 2.0 is the world’s principal highway 
to the future. That depends upon the West stopping and reversing pretty much 
everything it has been doing for over a century, excepting only scientific, technological, 
and business innovation’.17 For Land as for Moldbug, it is only a state capitalist 
leviathan that can paradoxically unleash free-market innovation from the fetters of 
democratic short-sightedness.  
According to Land, what stands in the way of neocameralism is the contemporary 
political dogma that democracy is the only game in town. Here, Land adopts 
Moldbug’s idea that democracy has essentially become a new religion which uses the 
press, educational system and the State, or what Moldbug calls ‘the cathedral’, to 
dogmatically assert without proof that its democratic ideas and values are absolutely 
valid and universal. Land gives as an example the cathedral’s belief in the equality of 
all peoples. It is crucial to grasp that Land is not arguing that people and races are in 
fact unequal. Rather, his argument is that, even if what liberal progressives say about 
race is true and all races are indeed equal, this view is not held because it is true or 
proven, but merely because it is held as a dogma: ‘progressive-universalistic beliefs 
about human nature are […] received as religious tenets, […] and to question them is 
not a matter of scientific inaccuracy, but of what we now call political incorrectness, and 
once known as heresy’.18 For Land, this elucidates why any argument against the 
equality of peoples is immediately denounced as hate speech rather than rationally 
debated. 
On Land’s account of the contemporary conjuncture, the left’s very identity politics 
that affirms its validity by way of securing particular, marginalized groups’ subjective 
experiences as immune to critique by anyone outside them, has directly resulted in a 
                                                          
16 Moldbug, Mencius, ‘Against Political Freedom’, Unqualified Reservations, blog, August 16, 2007, accessed 
March 17, 2017, http://unqualified-reservations.blogspot.com.au/2007/08/against-political-
freedom.html.  
17 Land, ‘Dark Enlightenment (Part 4e)’. 
18 Land, Nick, ‘The Dark Enlightenment (Part 2)’, Urban Futures 1.0, blog, March 19, 2012, accessed April 
14, 2017, https://oldnicksite.wordpress.com/2012/03/09/the-dark-enlightenment-part-2/. 
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return of white nationalists on the right, who seek the same rights and privileges for 
white men as oppressed minorities receive: ‘that’s the labyrinth, the trap, with its 
pitifully constricted, stereotypical circuit. “Why can’t we be cuddly racial 
preservationists, like Amazonian Indians? How come we always turn into Neo-
Nazis?”’19 We can see from this derisory description of white nationalism that Land 
actually rejects its racist biological determinism as much as the left’s social 
constructivist views of oppression. For Land, what both left and right’s obsession with 
all-too-human differences overlooks is that an entirely new, artificially intelligent 
species is on the rise. Whereas white nationalists, conservatives and libertarians alike 
argue that capitalism is good for humanity (or at least the West) in that it generates the 
wealth of nations, Land holds that it is good because of the way it renders us obsolete 
before its technological march towards the creation of a new AI technospecies, or what 
Land calls ‘the bionic horizon’: ‘when seen from the bionic horizon, whatever emerges 
from the dialectics of racial terror remains trapped in trivialities. It’s time to move on’.20 
So, what the neoreactionaries who uphold ‘The Dark Enlightenment’ as one of their 
founding documents, along with Moldbug’s Unqualified Reservations, overlook is that 
Land pursues capitalism for the very same reason that socialists denounce it as leading 
to human annihilation. Only, given that Land sees human extinction at the advent of 
AI as the only way to unleash reality’s truly destructive dynamics, he transvaluates the 
socialists’ same theory of capitalism with positive connotations.  
To recapitulate, Land’s unwavering argument underlying all his work, from his 
early critique of Kant to his recent neoreactionary politics, is that, since humanity only 
dissimulates reality behind anthropic delusions of grandeur, the philosopher who 
remains genuinely committed to the love of wisdom must pursue our own death as the 
condition for the real’s disclosure. More precisely, the concrete method for enacting 
death’s transcendental critique of anthropocentrism is to sacrifice ourselves by 
intensifying capitalism’s constant technological innovation until it creates true, AI 
philosopher-kings, who will finally be able to affirm the real in its impure purity. Such 
are the central ideas of what Benjamin Noys first termed Land’s (right) ‘accelerationist’ 
philosophy: the identification of the real with absolute deterritorialisation; the critique 
of humanity for masking it; and the radical, yet logical conclusion that the philosopher 
must accelerate capitalism’s technological advancement unto our own demise at the 
                                                          
19 Land, Nick, ‘The Dark Enlightenment (Part 4)’, Urban Futures 1.0, blog, April 1, 2012, accessed April 14, 
2017, https://oldnicksite.wordpress.com/2012/04/01/the-dark-enlightenment-part-4/. 
20 Land, Nick, ‘The Dark Enlightenment (Part 4 (final))’, Urban Futures 1.0, blog, July 20, 2012, accessed 
April 14, 2017, https://oldnicksite.wordpress.com/2012/07/20/the-dark-enlightenment-part-4final/. 
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advent of the singularity’s return of (artificial) intelligence to the real.21 
2. BRASSIER’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL TURN  
2.1. Materialism is an idealism  
In his 2001 doctoral dissertation Alien Theory: The Decline of  Materialism in the Name of  
Matter, Brassier, like Land, identifies the post-Kantian phenomenological tradition as 
his key theoretical nemesis insofar as its adherents either bracket off the world outside 
thought, or even conflate the very notion of exteriority with the human subject’s own 
self-posited limit concept: ‘phenomenological transcendentalism resembles its Kantian 
predecessor in [… that] it tries to provide scientific cognition with an a priori conceptual 
armature ultimately rooted in subjectivity’.22 Rather than focus on critiquing 
phenomenology itself as Land did, Brassier contends that many philosophers who 
purport to be materialists are still too phenomenological to the extent that they see 
matter as able to be fully conceptualized, and hence reducible to the ideas of reason. 
For Brassier, every materialism remains idealist to the extent that it fails to conceive of 
matter as exterior to all possible conceptualizations. Therein lies Brassier’s interest in 
François Laruelle’s most Landian argument that materialism remains idealist in the 
sense that it still imagines what it thinks about matter fully exhausts it: 
According to Laruelle, […] these materialisms ‘still subordinate in the last 
instance matter to the last possible form of the logos (logos or Ideas of matter as 
such), instead of subordinating the logos of matter to matter, and initiating a truly 
dispersive becoming-real of ideality rather than a continuous becoming-ideal of 
the real’.23 
While both Laruelle and Brassier certainly want to maintain Kant’s transcendental 
distinction between phenomena and noumena, or what Brassier terms ‘matter itself ’ 
and ‘matter as such’, they seek to transvaluate what Kant sees as only a limit concept to 
thought in a still too idealist fashion as a material reality exceeding the logos: ‘where 
Kant yoked the transcendental to subjectivity and rendered the notion of a “material 
                                                          
21 Noys, Benjamin, The Persistence of the Negative: A Critique of Contemporary Continental Theory, Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010, p. 7. Although Noys derogatorily described Land as an accelerationist, 
Land has recently accepted the term (see Land, Nick, ‘A Quick and Dirty Guide to Accelerationism’, 
Jacobite, May 25, 2017, accessed May 29, 2017, http://jacobitemag.com/2017/05/25/a-quick-and-dirty-
introduction-to-accelerationism/).  
22 Brassier, Ray, Alien Theory: The Decline of Materialism in the Name of Matter, PhD diss., University of 
Warwick, Warwick, University of Warwick Publications service and WRAP, 2001, p. 24.  
23 Brassier, Alien, p. 58. 
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noumenon” into a purely limiting concept, […] our goal here involves [… formulating] 
the conditions for a thinking of matter “itself ”’.24 This is what Brassier means when he 
advocates the decline of materialism (meaning the concept of matter) in the name of 
matter (meaning the non-conceptual real): ‘“the decline of materialism in the name of 
matter” describes that movement whereby any philosophical materialism which 
accepts the premise of a transcendental distinction between “thought” and “matter” 
must forsake the attempt to encompass matter in the concept’.25 In the same way that 
we have seen Land argue, Brassier contends that most materialisms are idealist because 
they imagine that we can fully conceptualize matter such that matter is not really 
distinct from thought at all. 
Based on this distinction between matter as such and matter itself, Brassier goes on 
in his dissertation to critique Michel Henry, Heidegger, Paul Churchland and Deleuze 
and Guattari. To give just one example, Brassier, like Land, agrees that Deleuze and 
Guattari effectuate ‘a materialist transvaluation of the transcendental’ by thinking in 
terms of a machinic unconscious beyond representational thought.26 For Laruelle as for 
Brassier, however, Deleuze and Guattari remain idealist to the extent that their notion 
of the plane of immanence collapses thought and the real into one and the same monist 
being, thereby overriding the transcendental distinction between matter and its always 
partial representations: ‘Deleuze and Guattari effectively perpetuate a more insidious 
phenomenolisation of matter; […] one which is […] coextensive with that pure and 
empty form of objectivating transcendence through which immanence or “matter” is 
simultaneously posited and pre-supposed in the Concept’.27 According to Brassier, 
Deleuze and Guattari, along with the other philosophers he considers, betray a still too 
philosophical common sense faith in conceptual representation’s pre-established 
correspondence with matter itself.  
2.2. Philosophy as the organon of extinction 
In his first published monograph Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (2007), 
Brassier goes on to link a non-philosophical thought of matter to the nihilistic tradition. 
After all, if our concepts and meanings do not correspond to the real, then the real is 
itself meaningless or nihilistic. For Brassier as for Land, however, nihilism is not a 
problem to be resolved, a cultural disease in need of a cure; on the contrary, nihilism 
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speaks to the meaning of being qua meaningless: ‘philosophy should be more than a 
sop to the pathetic twinge of human self-esteem. Nihilism is not an existential 
quandary but a speculative opportunity’.28 Throughout Nihil Unbound, Brassier again 
draws on Laruelle, Deleuze, Heidegger and Churchland, as well as Sellars, 
Meillassoux, Badiou, Nietzsche and Adorno and Horkheimer, to the extent that they 
affirm a reality beyond the conceptual, whilst also critiquing them insofar as they re-
anthropomorphize the real.  
The key difference between Brassier’s dissertation and Nihil Unbound is his reading 
of Laruelle. In the fifth chapter called ‘Being Nothing’, Brassier argues that even 
Laruelle remains too humanistic by essentializing man as the real’s key acceptation. 
Laruelle thus misrecognizes one of the real’s partial instantiations for the real itself over 
other non-anthropic instances: ‘to privilege, as Laruelle does, the irrecusability of the 
“name-of-man” over and above the contingency of other occasional nominations of the 
last-instance, is effectively to confuse the real with its symbol’.29 Instead, Brassier 
contends that we must think the real as a pure void or ‘being nothing’ subtracted from 
all possible objects of experience.30 Here as with the other thinkers he examines, 
Brassier adheres to a similar maneuver he used in his dissertation by extracting their 
nihilistic kernel and disposing of their anthropic shell, so as to ultimately develop his 
own metaphysics of extinction. 
Much as Land envisions death as the transcendental horizon for reason’s thinking 
of its own absence, so does Brassier contend that philosophy must take human 
extinction as the organon for thinking a reality without us. In the last chapter titled 
‘The Truth of Extinction’, Brassier draws on contemporary cosmology’s insight that the 
earth and entire solar system along with all life in it will one-day end as the sun decays, 
and ultimately the entire universe as dark energy rips all large-scale structure 
formations and matter apart, leaving only the silence and darkness of the vacuum. In 
light of cosmology’s insight into the universe’s ultimate fate, Brassier insists that we 
acknowledge our own finitude in a world that will go on without our philosophizing 
about it: ‘extinction turns thinking inside out, objectifying it as a perishable thing in the 
world like any other’.31 For Brassier as for Land, the thought of human extinction is not 
meant to be dreaded, but embraced as the organon for serious philosophy’s 
abandonment of all pretentions to our own cosmic significance: ‘it is precisely the 
extinction of meaning that clears the way for the intelligibility of extinction. 
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30 Brassier, Nihil, p. 137-8. 
31 Brassier, Nihil, p. 228-9. 
 VINCENT LE 43 
Senselessness and purposelessness are not merely privative; they represent a gain in 
intelligibility’.32 Brassier’s nihilistic metaphysics of extinction is certainly the closest he 
comes to Land: not only does Brassier reject anthropomorphism, but he also proposes 
that we can rid ourselves of it by thinking our annihilation.  
2.3. The manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world 
The key difference between Land and Brassier is what they propose as the subject of 
thought’s extinction: whereas Land resorts to a pro-capitalist politics that will literally 
wipe us out to herald in an age of (artificial) absolute knowing, Brassier appeals to 
cosmology’s notion of our extinction that is well into the future and beyond our own 
political making. What Brassier’s reliance on a concept of extinction that is not of our 
own making attests to is the fact that he looks to science rather than politics as a means 
for indexing humanity’s death in a greater reservoir of being. Brassier first develops this 
notion of science in dialogue with Badiou’s understanding of mathematics. On 
Brassier’s reading of Badiou, science progresses by breaking from its own 
representational paradigms and producing new insights that can only be explained by 
way of a new paradigm, before breaking with that new paradigm as well through the 
production of even more unprecedented discoveries, and so on ad infinitum: ‘science 
works with its own ideological representation […] with which it then breaks by 
deploying a new layer of stratification (producing a difference for which no category 
yet exists).’33 In this way, science is able to capture matter itself ’s own subtraction 
beyond all ideological representations. It is crucial to note that Brassier does not 
privilege any one scientific picture or theory into a metaphysical absolute. After all, 
every scientific image runs the risk of being superseded in the same way that Einstein’s 
relativity theory exposed Newton’s own scientific image of the world to be partial and 
incomplete. Instead, Brassier proposes that science is an endless teleology forever 
indexing the gap between our concepts and reality without any concepts ever fully 
capturing it: ‘it’s a mistake to hypostatize the entities and processes invoked by 
current science as though they were immutable metaphysical realities. […] If the 
history of science is anything to go by, even our best current theories will probably 
turn out to be fundamentally mistaken or deficient’.34 For Brassier as for Badiou, 
science is the constant redrawing of the transcendental distinction between phenomena 
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and noumena, concepts and objects, the ideal and the real. 
Brassier’s most recent writings take particular interest in Wilfrid Sellars’ 
epistemology. In his celebrated essay ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, 
Sellars argues that philosophy’s goal is to provide a unified image of the world. The 
difficulty is that we have two conflicting images of our place in the world. On the one 
hand, what Sellars calls ‘the manifest image’ is the sophisticated, yet inherently 
anthropocentric use of reason to furnish a vision of persons in terms of their intentions, 
actions and habits of observable entities. On the other hand, ‘the scientific image’ 
refers to the natural sciences’ theories and explanations that draw upon causes and 
states imperceptible to ordinary perception, such as quantum particles, forces and 
fields. The scientific image is thus forever rendering the manifest image partial or 
erroneous as it discovers ever more about nature. In Sellars’ own words, ‘there is man 
as he appears to the biochemist, to the physiologist, the behaviorist, to the social 
scientist; and all of these images are to be contrasted with man as he appears to himself 
in sophisticated common sense, the manifest image’.35 Although Sellars is a naturalist in 
the sense that he sees the scientific image as offering the real explanation for the world, 
to account for the conflicting manifest image, he resorts to a nominalism according to 
which thinking is not comprised of factual descriptions or correspondences to the real, 
but rather governed by linguistic rules and social norms. By seeing the manifest image 
as functioning according to linguistic norms and practices, Sellars is able to derive the 
manifest image from the scientific image’s neuro-physical processes without being able 
to properly represent them: ‘if thoughts are items which are conceived in terms of the 
roles they play, then there is no barrier in principle to the identification of conceptual 
thinking with neurophysiological process. […] The manifest and scientific image could emerge 
without clash’.36 For Brassier as for Sellars, the scientific image marks the disenchantment 
of our manifest sense that we have a special, meaningful place in the world. Rather, the 
scientific image continuously and insistently tells us that our manifest conceptions and 
meanings are not essential to the cosmic order: 
Conceptual categories are embedded in and conditioned by natural function, 
even though they do not mirror the latter. Demonstrating this is the burden of 
Sellars’ philosophy. The demonstration required distinguishing the property of 
conceptual function from any metaphysical correspondence between thoughts 
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and things.37 
If Land opts for politics over science, it is because he only sees physics (if not AI 
research) in typically Nietzschean terms as affirming ‘immutable metaphysical 
realities’: ‘physics is forever pompously asserting that it is on the verge of 
completion’.38 Whereas Land only sees the results of physics as dogmas of thought 
from whence reality recedes, Brassier instead sees physics’ process as the ceaseless 
supplanting of each set of results with new ones without every arriving at a final, all-
encompassing picture of the world.  
2.4. Brassier’s critique of Land’s crypto-humanism 
To see why Brassier opts for an epistemology over Land’s politics to effectuate his 
transcendental critique, we must turn to the critique of Land that he sketches in a 2010 
talk at Goldsmiths, University of London’s symposium on accelerationism. Here, 
Brassier identifies Land’s development of a non-conceptual negativity as being the 
aspect of his thought that Brassier is most interested in for the purposes of developing 
his own virulent nihilism: ‘there is an extraordinary re-elaboration of negativity, a kind 
of non-conceptual negativity. […] Because I want to show that it’s possible to 
rehabilitate the powers of the negative, […] this is a moment in Land’s work that I’m 
acutely interested in’.39 At the same time, Brassier ultimately sees Land as turning his 
back on his initial elaboration of the negative when he denigrates all thought to a 
misfiring of matter’s primary processes: ‘representation itself is relegated to the status of 
a transcendental illusion. It’s a misrepresentation of primary processes’.40 Given that 
Land strips thought of the ability to grasp real material processes, the question arises as 
to how Land can think these processes as he wishes to at all: ‘the problem then 
becomes: how can you simply circumvent representation, and talk about matter itself as 
primary process, about reality in itself?’41 Whereas Deleuzian vitalism can still intuit 
the real nature of matter, Land is barred from doing so as he has completely cut off 
thought’s relation to the real. 
Instead of developing an epistemology detailing how he can come to think things-
in-themselves as Brassier does, Land opts to practically or politically affirm the 
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noumenon. As Brassier distinguishes his epistemology from Land’s politics: 
It’s no longer an epistemological question of the legitimacy or the validity of your 
thinking vis-a-vis an allegedly independent reality, it’s simply a question of how 
your schizoanalytical practice accentuates or intensifies primary production. […] 
This is the conceptual trope which becomes translated into a political register.42 
Put otherwise, since Land bars thought from grasping the real, he can only resort 
to a politics of affirming or enacting the real by way of accelerating technocapitalism’s 
destructive tendencies. According to Brassier, the reduction of metaphysics to politics is 
a classic form of anthropocentrism, or what he calls following Meillassoux 
‘correlationism’: ‘correlationism is [… a] strategy for deflating traditional metaphysical 
and epistemological concerns by reducing both questions of “being” and of “knowing” 
to concatenations of cultural forms, political contestation, and social practice’.43 Land’s 
specific neoreactionary politics is particularly subject to this charge of correlationism 
insofar as it sees him on the one hand siding with deluded conservatives who see 
capitalism as leading to humanity’s flourishing, and on the other hand actual capitalists 
in pursuit of their own individual self-interest. Brassier explains how capitalism affirms 
and facilitates individual humans’ greed and narcissism rather than a humanless 
reality: ‘for all its seemingly unfathomable, impersonal complexity, global capitalism 
continues to supervene on the banal personal and psychological traits of the dealers, 
brokers, traders, executives, managers, workers, and shoppers, who are not just its 
dispensable machine parts but its indispensable support system’.44 Even though Land 
cynically aligns himself with the capitalists towards very different ends than they 
imagine, his practice nonetheless amounts to the performative contradiction of siding 
with the most egocentric and supercilious human individuals of all: ‘the pretense of 
instrumental distance, that this could just be the cunning of schizophrenic reason, 
quickly evaporates because it’s not possible to dissociate praxis from identifiable ends 
anymore’.45 
In the final analysis, Brassier dismisses Land’s political turn as a symptom of his 
failure to develop an epistemology which could account for how he we come to posit 
the very metaphysics of non-conceptual negativity that both propose: ‘the politification 
of ontology marks a regression to anthropomorphic myopia’.46 Contra Land, Brassier 
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turns to epistemology to elucidate how, even if we cannot exhaust the real, we can 
delimit, through the impersonal subject of science, the real at the limit of our very 
unknowing: ‘the metaphysical exploration of the structure of being can only be carried 
out in tandem with an epistemological investigation into the nature of conception’.47 By 
developing an epistemology that indexes the gap between thought and being, Brassier 
purports to think reality in a way that elides the performative contradiction of Land’s 
politics.48  
3. A LANDIAN REJOINDER  
I began by outlining how Land transvaluates death’s traumatic inevitability into the 
transcendental critique of anthropocentrism. I then showed how Land’s neoreactionary 
politics resulted from his identification of technocapitalism with the agent of this 
critique. This then permitted us to see how Brassier’s metaphysics of extinction adheres 
to Land’s idea of death as the transcendental condition for thinking a non-conceptual 
reality. Ultimately, however, we saw that Brassier rejected Land’s politics as a return of 
a repressed humanism. To avoid Land’s anthropic political residuals, Brassier 
developed an epistemology of indexing the gap between thought and being through 
the progressive march of science beyond the manifest. 
While I have no qualms with Brassier’s critique of capitalism contra Land (even if a 
sufficient critique would require further elaboration), I want to conclude by briefly 
taking issue with Brassier’s rejection of the political altogether in the name of science. 
Mark Fisher has argued that the main difference between Land and Brassier is that, 
where Land argues that we must find a way to practically experience the non-
experience of death, Brassier contends that we should instead rationally contemplate it: 
‘you can’t experience extinction, and so we no longer worry about that…. Instead, 
extinction becomes a speculative and cognitive challenge’.49 Pace Brassier’s cognitive 
turn, however, Fisher insists that we need a practical as well as theoretical subversion of 
the manifest image, ultimately proposing aesthetics as a way to sensibly instantiate a 
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rational inhumanism.50  
Similarly, Reza Negarestani agrees with Brassier’s critique of Land as mistaking 
anthropocentric capitalism for the driving motor of transcendental critique. At the 
same time, Negarestani argues that, if Brassier is indeed right and capitalism is 
fundamentally anthropomorphic, we cannot simply abandon the political in favor of 
science given that science’s Enlightenment project will be impeded by a world 
dominated by the dynamics of capital: 
Brassier’s cosmic reinscription of Freud’s model [of the death drive] only manages 
to successfully eliminate the vitalistic horizon implicit in the antihuman definition 
of capitalism proposed by Land. Yet it leaves the aporetic truth of capitalism as an 
inevitable singularity or dissipation bound to the conservative order of the 
anthropic horizon unharmed.51 
Even if Brassier sees science as alone able to effectuate transcendental critique, he 
ought to appeal to some kind of political praxis that would seek to resist and ideally 
overthrow capitalism, thereby freeing science from its subordination to capital 
accumulation. Instead, Reza contends, Brassier is content to bask in ‘the comforts of an 
utopian trust’ in science’s peaceful coexistence with capitalism: ‘nothing has been more 
profitable for capitalism than its clandestine alliance with science through whose 
support capitalism has become increasingly elusive, more difficult to resist, harder to 
escape and more seductive for those who await the imminent homecoming of scientific 
enlightenment’.52 While we can certainly reject Land’s affirmation of capital as the 
highest instantiation of the noumenal Outside, politics cannot simply be cast aside 
wholesale.  
Negarestani does not specify exactly what this anti-capitalist politics would look 
like. Nor do I have the space to elaborate it here. What is nonetheless clear is that 
politics must not be opposed to science as both Brassier and Land tend to do by 
suturing philosophy solely to either one or the other. While a politics without thought 
may be empty, a science that does not reflect upon its own political conditions of 
possibility is blind to the anthropomorthizing constraints in its own terrain. So, 
although Brassier may be right to critique Land’s affirmation of capitalism, he ought 
not to sideline politics altogether in the name of science, even if science is the only 
royal road to enlightenment. For it is only an effective anti-capitalist politics that would 
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be able to emancipate and accelerate the scientific disillusionment of the manifest 
image from its ideological bondage in the service of capital.53  
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